Mexican Drug Cartels launder money through horse stables

By George H Wittman
American Spectator

In recent weeks Mexican cartel money laundering operations in the United States have been exposed as imaginative and daring. In the two principal cases uncovered, very different devices were used by the drug trafficking managers. These cases are an introduction to the breadth of mechanisms available to turn dirty money clean.
Perhaps the operation that had the most elaborate cover, yet a still relatively simple financial structure, was the most forward-looking. One of the top figures in Mexico's Los Zetas drug organization, Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, had a younger brother who liked horses, needed a job, and was available to manage a ranch (bought through an intermediary with drug profits) south of Oklahoma City.

Along with his wife and three children, young José Treviño Morales set about to establish himself as an owner/breeder of quarter horses. He paid for everything in cash or by using false names and accounts of supposed partners. Treviño Morales and his considerable ranch staff of fourteen built a reputation of fair bargaining and quick payment. The 400-plus horse enterprise was the envy of many other breeders with less deep pockets, but any annoyance was quickly salved by the fair and generous business practices of the Treviño Morales operation.

Meanwhile millions of dollars in cash accrued by the drug trafficking operation of the Zetas was "cleansed" in the accounting for the high maintenance quarter horse breeding and racing business. The stable's reputation grew as it began to turn out serious winners on the track and at the auctions in Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, and California. The overall operation was incorporated since 2008 as Tremor Enterprises LLC -- and they paid all their bills on time.
 
The New York Times once again appears to have had an inside source within law enforcement, for when it broke the story on June 12 citing its "investigations lasting months" and anonymous sources, federal authorities, including FBI Special Agents, swooped in on the ranch the same day. They were able to arrest only 7 of the 14 indicted, including José Treviño Morales and his wife. Whether this was due to the Times's early publication has not been surfaced. At this point, however, the U.S. Government has seized 41 of the choicest horses and is arranging for the care of the other 384.

While the Treviño Morales horse breeding operation reportedly successfully "cleaned" tens of millions of dollars -- and won some very large racing purses on the side -- another less romantic money laundering and drug trafficking dance was in process in nearby Western and Midwestern states. Due to the United States' tightening of controls on the production of chemicals used in the making of methamphetamine, the manufacture and shipment of meth from Mexico has grown exponentially.

Many mid-sized American gangs purchase cargos of meth either directly from Mexican cartel producers or intermediaries who have illegally transported the product over the Mexican/U.S. border using both witting and unwitting truck drivers. The meth is then carried from border sites to middlemen in California, Colorado, and elsewhere central to the customer base. One such operation, according to the DEA, owned both a legitimate trucking company and an import/export firm. The latter carried licenses to import goods from China, thus allowing a legal route for money to flow to China and then return in goods or money transfers to Mexico -- and the cycle would begin again.

While there are several versions of the foregoing used in money laundering, one of the most reliable remains the utilization of the real estate market. Purchase and resale of high-end real estate properties (residential or commercial) has been a natural route for cleaning dirty money. Resale at an appropriate price to a bona fide entity creates a cleansed account and money that can be transferred anywhere in the world.

There are many mechanisms now employed by the drug cartels to clean up the cash they obtain through illicit drug sales in the United States and Canada. All that is needed is an intermediary that can maintain the appearance of a legitimate cash flow (such as service and import/export concerns), and careful accounting takes care of the rest. Casinos and high volume restaurants are always an attractive money laundering target. While new and different mechanisms always become available, funneling money into the American stock and commodity markets remains a high priority objective.

The establishment of a legitimate-appearing identity is the sole criterion for creating an investment account allowing considerable sums to be moved around domestically and internationally. Clean identities have evolved through repeated transfers of money from Mexico and other Latin American sources to the Gulf States of the Middle East, China, Southeast Asia and eventually to the usual small countries with discreet banking and taxation laws. It takes quite a bit of imaginative accounting, but it's worth the effort to cover the original sources.

Thus it is the establishment of an acceptable identity that is the key to all illegal money movement. It need not be as elaborate as horse breeding; it can be as simple as what the KGB used to call a "documented legend" that involves a birth certificate, Social Security number -- or equivalent -- and exclusive club membership plus well-distributed cash. This and a few other accoutrements and the money launderer is ready to have a respected friend call his local hard-charging broker with a new client. The securities business swears it's much harder than that, but the Bernie Madoff case showed how social connections and well-covered accounting make a swindle work. The laundering con works the same way



Michael Hearns an Anti Money Laundering specialist with over 27 years of AML experience can also be found at www.launderingmoney.com and on twitter at: http://twitter.com/#!/LaunderingMoney as well as http://moneylaunderingworld.blogspot.com

Mexican drug kingpin Benjamin Arellano Felix pleads guilty to US charges in San Diego

Mexican drug kingpin Benjamin Arellano Felix pleaded guilty Wednesday to racketeering and conspiracy to launder money, avoiding the spectacle of a trial for the leader of a cartel that once smuggled hundreds of tons of cocaine and marijuana into the United States and dissolved bodies of its rivals in vats of lye.
Under an agreement with federal prosecutors, Arellano Felix, 58, can be sentenced to no more than 25 years in prison — a lighter punishment than ordered for lower-ranking members of his once-mighty, Tijuana-based cartel.
Prosecutors agreed to dismiss other charges that could have brought 140 years in prison if he was convicted.
The half-hour hearing was an anticlimactic finish to the U.S. government’s pursuit of one of the world’s most powerful drug bosses during the 1990s. His cartel, with its iron-tight grip on the drug trade along California’s border with Mexico, was portrayed in the Steven Soderbergh film “Traffic” but has struggled in recent years as other cartels have become more ruthless than ever.
Laura Duffy, the U.S. attorney in San Diego who built much of her career on the case, said Arellano Felix will likely spend the rest of his life in U.S. prison but did not elaborate on the reasoning for the plea deal.
“Today’s guilty plea marks the end of his reign of murder, mayhem and corruption, and his historic admission of guilt sends a clear message to the Mexican cartel leaders operating today: The United States will spare no effort to investigate, extradite and prosecute you for your criminal activities,” Duffy said.
Arellano Felix stood attentively in court, acknowledging his guilt as U.S. District Judge Larry Burns recited parts of a 17-page plea agreement. He told the judge that he has been suffering migraine headaches almost daily but that the problem didn’t impair his judgment to accept the plea agreement.
Anthony Colombo Jr., Arellano Felix’s attorney, said his client could be released from U.S. prison in 20 years if credited for time served in this country and good behavior, assuming he gets the maximum 25-year sentence. As a Mexican citizen, he would then be deported to Mexico, where he still has nine years left on a sentence for related crimes.
Colombo said the government may have agreed to the deal to avoid having to bargain with 21 potential government witnesses for reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony. They also may have wanted to avoid a lengthy trial.
“They have to consider years and years of litigation, plus the expense, is avoided by this resolution,” Colombo told reporters.
John Kirby, a former federal prosecutor who co-wrote the 2003 indictment against Arellano Felix, said the case rested entirely on cooperating witnesses, instead of wiretaps or physical evidence. He said those cases weaken over time as witnesses die, get into more trouble or change their minds about testifying.
“This kind of case is based solely on witness testimony, and it slowly disintegrates,” Kirby said. “Maybe from the time when we put it together and now, it’s not such a great case anymore.”
The cost of a trial was unlikely to have influenced prosecutors, Kirby said.
“The government doesn’t care about the expense, the government cares about winning,” he said.
Francisco Javier Arellano Felix, a younger brother who led the cartel after Benjamin was arrested in Mexico in 2002, was sentenced in San Diego to life in prison in 2007, a year after he was captured by U.S. authorities in international waters off Mexico’s Baja California coast. Jesus Labra Aviles, a lieutenant under Benjamin Arellano Felix, was sentenced in San Diego to 40 years in prison in 2010.
Benjamin Arellano Felix was extradited from Mexico in April 2011 to face drug, money-laundering and racketeering charges, one of the highest-profile kingpins to face prosecution in the United States.
The U.S. indictment said Arellano Felix was the top leader of a cartel he led with his brothers, going back to 1986. It says the cartel tortured and killed rivals in the United States and Mexico as it smuggled Mexican marijuana and Colombian cocaine.
“He was the top of the chain,” Kirby said. “The brothers were at the top, and he was at the very top. He had the final say ... He was like the CEO of the operation.”
The cartel began to lose influence along California’s border with Mexico after Arellano Felix was arrested in 2002. A month earlier, his brother, Ramon, called the cartel’s top enforcer, died in a shootout with Mexican authorities.
Benjamin Arellano Felix was incarcerated in Mexico after his 2002 arrest and was later sentenced to 22 years in prison on drug trafficking and organized crime charges.
Arellano Felix also agreed to forfeit $100 million, a figure that will be difficult for the government to collect.
“Whether there is anything out there that (the government) can seize, I don’t know,” Colombo said.
Sentencing was set for April 2.


Michael Hearns an Anti Money Laundering specialist with over 24 years of AML experience can also be found at http://www.launderingmoney.com/ and on twitter at : http://twitter.com/#!/LaunderingMoney http://moneylaunderingworld.blogspot.com/

Zapata drug leader convicted on money laundering charges

By Jim Kouri,

Public Safety Examiner

Pedro Navarro Jr., of Zapata, Texas, pleaded guilty Thursday before U.S. Magistrate Judge Guillermo Garcia to his roles in distributing marijuana and methamphetamine and then laundering proceeds from those drug sales.

The 36-year old Navarro is the leader of a drug trafficking and money laundering organization operating out of the Zapata, Texas, area from approximately June 2006 through June 2011.

During his plea hearing Thursday, Navarro admitted that between February 2008 and June 2011, he was responsible for transporting numerous shipments of controlled substances from the Zapata area to other parts of Texas and beyond.

Some of these drug shipments were interdicted by law enforcement, including numerous loads of marijuana totaling thousands of kilograms and approximately five kilograms of methamphetamine which was seized in Beasley, Texas, on April 5, 2011.

During his plea hearing, Navarro also confessed to being a member and leader of the drug trafficking conspiracy responsible for these marijuana and methamphetamine loads. In addition to being responsible for transporting drugs, he also admitted he used a residence on Falcon Lake to store the marijuana after it had been smuggled from Mexico into the United States.

This marijuana would normally be ferried across the lake from Mexico at night in small boats, which would pull up to his residence on the lake where individuals would then unload the marijuana. Later, Navarro would then ensure the marijuana was loaded into passenger vehicles at the residence which would be driven to wherever the drugs were destined

Navarro also admitted that he conspired with others to launder money, which represented the proceeds of his drug trafficking. He agreed to transport large amounts of United States currency, which were the proceeds of drug trafficking, from the Zapata area to Mexico, and did so with the intention of promoting the continued operation of his drug trafficking business.

Navarro specifically agreed to help transport this money to Mexico, where it would be given to other members of the drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracies.

These persons provided the drugs which were being trafficked as well as provided them the money in question, thereby ensuring their illegal drug trafficking business would continue in operation. One of the specific loads of money for which Navarro was responsible included approximately $23,425 seized at or near Hebbronville, Texas, on March 9, 2010.

Navarro also used some of the proceeds he made from drug trafficking to build a residence in Zapata. During the course of the drug trafficking conspiracy, the members of conspiracy were responsible for generating proceeds from that activity in the amount of at least $18 million.

Navarro's sentencing date has yet to be scheduled.

Michael Hearns an Anti Money Laundering specialist with over 24 years of AML experience can also be found at www.launderingmoney.com and on twitter at : http://twitter.com/#!/LaunderingMoney http://moneylaunderingworld.blogspot.com
http://launderingmoney.com

Money Laundering Crackdown Flounders in Mexico, But Does it Really Matter?

By Patrick Corcoran

Insight Crime

Despite a gathering consensus around the idea of making financial ops a key part of Mexico's anti-drug strategy, cracking down on money laundering will never be able to make a real impact on organized crime in the country.A series of articles published by the Los Angeles Times last weekend illustrate how Mexican criminal groups use the global system to move billions of dollars from the U.S. to Mexico on an annual basis, with both governments thus far unable to make much of a dent in the illicit flow of cash.

As the Los Angeles Times reports:

Even President Felipe Calderon, who sent the army into the streets to chase traffickers after taking office in 2006, an offensive that has seen 43,000 people die since, concedes that Mexico has fallen short in attacking the financial strength of organized crime.

"Without question, we have been at fault," Calderon said during a meeting last month with drug-war victims. "The truth is that the existing structures for detecting money-laundering were simply overwhelmed by reality."

The report also delivers a series of statistics demonstrating the government's failure to crack down on the proceeds of the drug trade. According to the articles’ authors, the amount of illicit cash seized by Mexican authorities peaked in 2008 at $71.4 million. The figure dropped to less than $60 million in 2009, $24 million in 2010, and the government is on pace to seize just $12 million this year. Estimates of the amount of cash laundered in Mexico run from roughly $10 billion to $45 billion annually, which suggests that in its best year in recent memory, the government was able to seize, at best, no more than 0.7 percent of all the illicit cash in the country.

In light of these statistics, the logical conclusion might be that neither the U.S. nor the Mexican government is doing enough to tamp down on money laundering. However, it’s also worth considering another possibility: the figures are so paltry because anti-money laundering (AML) efforts are exceedingly difficult, which makes it unlikely that AML will ever be a significant tool in the fight against organized crime. Therefore, increasing the government resources dedicated to cracking down on dirty money could divert resources away from more fruitful methods of attacking criminal groups.

The impediments to tracking illicit money were documented for InSight Crime by Alejandro Hope several weeks ago: the small size of the drug trade relative to the economy as a whole -- Mexico’s annual GDP is more than a trillion dollars in nominal terms, and almost $1.6 trillion by purchasing power parity -- makes tracking dirty money akin to searching for a needle in a haystack. Furthermore, the fact that gangsters cannot finance their purchases on credit means that they need to immediately reinvest a high proportion of their revenues to keep themselves in operation. This further reduces the amount of dirty money laundered in the legal economy, and further complicates AML efforts.

Another problem is the size of the informal economy. The IMF, for instance, estimates that 30 percent of Mexico’s economy is informal, and other Latin American nations have a similarly high rate. Such a huge space for cash-only, virtually untraceable transactions offers a ready sanctuary for gangs looking to hide the proceeds of drug sales. Not coincidentally, one of the more significant criminal trends in recent years is gangs like the Zetaa increasingly involving themselves in pirate merchandising.

As the LA Times reported, trade between Mexico and the U.S. provides another avenue for gangs looking to pass illicit cash across the border. But with legitimate commerce between the two nations estimated at $400 billion annually, the playing field will always be tilted toward the gangsters who want to move tens of thousands of dollars at a time.

Even beyond the operational obstacles to cracking down on criminal revenues, there are conceptual problems. Neither Mexico nor the U.S. government has adequately defined the goal of AML: is it to reduce the amount of revenues, or is it to dismantle existing gangs?

If it is merely to reduce the profits, it’s worth noting once again the tiny size of the amounts seized thus far. Is the legislation being proposed going to lead to exponentially larger amounts of dirty cash being seized? The seems an unlikely result. This doesn’t make stricter AML laws a bad idea, but government officials and analysts alike would do well to temper their enthusiasm and weigh the potential benefits against the costs to the legitimate economy.

If the primary goal is to dismantle existing groups, then the question becomes whether AML is successful where other law enforcement tactics -- infiltrating smuggling networks, electronic surveillance, etc. -- fail to bring about a criminal group’s demise. While there may be some isolated instances of this dynamic, they are the exception rather than the rule. In any event, no one arguing for stronger AML provisions is making this case.

An alternative argument for AML laws is that captured criminals and their families should be prevented from enjoying ill-gotten wealth. This may be valid, but it means that attacking dirty money is essentially an after-the-fact, punitive measure rather than the head of the law enforcement spear.

Many analysts point to crackdowns on terrorist financing as evidence of the AML’s potential for organized crime, but there is an important difference between the two: money is a terrorist group’s means to the end, i.e. launching terrorist attacks. Governments do not worry about terrorist groups having large bank accounts, per se, but rather about them being more able to carry out attacks on civilians. AML efforts reduce the ability of terrorist groups to kill civilians, even if they don’t necessarily lead to prosecutions.

The dynamic with organized crime groups is fundamentally different. A large bank account is the end in and of itself for a capo like Joaquin Guzman, alias "El Chapo." Therefore, attacking his assets doesn’t reduce his ability to harm society the way it does for a terrorist boss. If anything, in fact, it does the opposite; a capo could very well compensate for a marginal reduction in his profits by ramping up production of illegal drugs and flooding the market with more merchandise.

Most of the contenders for the 2012 Mexican presidential election --including the overwhelming favorite, Enrique Peña Nieto -- have also paid lip service to the idea that stronger AML efforts are a vital part of the next administration’s security strategy. From the standpoint of politics, this makes sense; calling on the government to go after the criminals’ financial networks sounds determined and serious. But advocates of AML have made little effort to justify what remains a relatively novel and untested approach.

With regard to stopping money laundering, neither the "how" nor the "why" have been fully answered.

Michael Hearns an Anti Money Laundering specialist with over 24 years of AML experience can also be found at www.launderingmoney.com and on twitter at : http://twitter.com/#!/LaunderingMoney http://moneylaunderingworld.blogspot.com http://launderingmoney.com

International banks have aided Mexican drug gangs

 

Raul Salinas de Gortari, brother of former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, used a maze of accounts in New York-based Citibank and other U.S. banks to secretly transfer millions of dollars to Switzerland in the 1980s and '90s, when he was employed as a middle-ranking bureaucrat.

Despite strict rules, some banks have failed to 'know their customer' or ask about the source of large amounts of cash, allowing billions in dirty money from Mexico to be laundered.

By Tracy Wilkinson and Ken Ellingwood
Los Angeles Times

Money launderers for ruthless Mexican drug gangs have long had a formidable ally: international banks.

Despite strict rules set by international regulatory bodies that require banks to "know their customer," make inquiries about the source of large deposits of cash and report suspicious activity, they have failed to do so in a number of high-profile cases and instead have allowed billions in dirty money to be laundered.

And those who want to stop cartels from easily moving their money express concern that banks that are caught get off with a slap on the wrist.

Banking powerhouse Wachovia Corp. last year agreed to pay $160 million in forfeitures and fines after U.S. federal prosecutors accused it of "willfully" overlooking the suspicious character of more than $420 billion in transactions between the bank and Mexican currency-exchange houses — much of it probably drug money, investigators say.

Federal prosecutors said Wachovia failed to detect and report numerous operations that should have raised red flags, and continued to work with the exchange houses long after other banks stopped doing so because of the "high risk" that it was a money-laundering operation.

Wachovia was moving money on behalf of the exchange houses through wire transfers, traveler's checks, even large hauls of bulk cash, investigators said. Some of the money was eventually traced to the purchase of small airplanes used to smuggle cocaine from South America to Mexico, they said.

"Wachovia's blatant disregard for our banking laws gave international cocaine cartels a virtual carte blanche to finance their operations," U.S. Atty. Jeffrey H. Sloman said in announcing the case last year, hailed at the time by authorities as one of the most significant in stopping dirty money from contaminating the U.S. financial system.

Wachovia paid the $160 million in what is called a deferred-prosecution agreement; no one went to prison, and the fines represented a tiny fraction of the money the bank had filtered. In court documents cited by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Wachovia acknowledged serious lapses.

In a similar case, another banking giant, HSBC Bank, is being monitored by U.S. regulators after a probe last year focused on bulk cash that the bank's U.S. branch received from Mexican exchange houses, money suspected to be drug proceeds.

One of the regulators, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, said HSBC had "critical deficiencies" in its 2006-2009 reporting of suspicious activities and its monitoring of bulk-cash transfers.

The OCC issued a cease-and-desist order against HSBC, noting, "The bank's compliance program and its implementation are ineffective, and accompanied by aggravating factors, such as highly suspicious activity creating a significant potential for unreported money-laundering or terrorist financing."

After U.S. federal prosecutors issued grand jury subpoenas, some believed that regulators might try to use the HSBC case to set an example and prosecute individual bankers. Instead, HSBC agreed to strengthen its compliance program and has said it is cooperating with investigators, without acknowledging wrongdoing, part of a so-called consent order.

Bryan Hubbard, a spokesman for the OCC, said last month that "OCC examiners continue to monitor actions by the bank to correct deficiencies and comply with that [consent] order."

In Mexico, authorities say they have taken steps to control and monitor money-laundering. Banking regulations in force since 1997 require reporting and canceling of suspicious accounts, and additional measures last year that put limits on dollar deposits in banks further tightened the restrictions.

"We have been able to establish a system of prevention that is quite robust," Jose Alberto Balbuena, head of the Finance Ministry's Financial Intelligence Unit, said in an interview. "We have a much clearer picture today of what dollars are entering the financial system, where they came from, where they are."

The restrictions have also forced traffickers and their launderers to channel more money into other sectors, such as real estate and commerce, avoiding banks altogether. Mexican and U.S. officials are looking to plug those gaps.

Complicity by banks has a deep history that still resonates in Mexico.

U.S. congressional investigators alleged that Raul Salinas' wife personally carried check after check to the bank, where Citibank executives asked no questions — despite rampant rumors that linked Salinas to drug lords, and even when Salinas was held on charges that he masterminded the assassination of a top politician. The Salinases claimed that they were victims of a political persecution, the Justice Department and Switzerland investigated, and there were calls for reform of banking secrecy laws.

No criminal charges of money-laundering or illicit enrichment were filed against Salinas. He is a free and wealthy man today. In 2008, Switzerland, which had frozen his bank accounts, returned most of the money.

Michael Hearns an Anti Money Laundering specialist with over 24 years of AML experience can also be found at www.launderingmoney.com and on twitter at : http://twitter.com/#!/LaunderingMoney http://moneylaunderingworld.blogspot.com http://launderingmoney.com

Mexico seeks to fill drug war gap with focus on dirty money

By Ken Ellingwood and Tracy Wilkinson,
Los Angeles Times

THE EVOLVING ANTI-LAUNDERING CAMPAIGN COULD CHANGE THE TONE OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT'S BATTLE BY STRIKING AT THE HEART OF THE CARTELS' FINANCIAL EMPIRE, ANALYSTS SAY.

Tainted drug money runs like whispered rumors all over Mexico's economy — in gleaming high-rises in beach resorts such as Cancun, in bustling casinos in Monterrey, in skyscrapers and restaurants in Mexico City that sit empty for months. It seeps into the construction sector, the night-life industry, even political campaigns.

Piles of greenbacks, enough to fill dump trucks, are transformed into gold watches, showrooms full of Hummers, aviation schools, yachts, thoroughbred horses and warehouses full of imported fabric.

Officials here say the tide of laundered money could reach as high as $50 billion, a staggering sum equal to about 3% of Mexico's legitimate economy, or more than all its oil exports or spending on prime social programs.

Mexican leaders often trumpet their deadly crackdown against drug traffickers as an all-out battle involving tens of thousands of troops and police, high-profile arrests and record-setting narcotics seizures. The 5-year-old offensive, however, has done little to attack a chief source of the cartels' might: their money.

Even President Felipe Calderon, who sent the army into the streets to chase traffickers after taking office in 2006, an offensive that has seen 43,000 people die since, concedes that Mexico has fallen short in attacking the financial strength of organized crime.

"Without question, we have been at fault," Calderon said during a meeting last month with drug-war victims. "The truth is that the existing structures for detecting money-laundering were simply overwhelmed by reality."

Experts say the unchecked flow of dirty money feeds a widening range of criminal activity as cartels branch into other enterprises, such as producing and trading in pirated merchandise.

"All this generates more crime," said Ramon Garcia Gibson, a former compliance officer at Citibank and an expert in money-laundering. "At the end of the day, this isn't good for anyone."

Officials on both sides of the border have begun taking tentative steps to stem the flow of dirty money. For Instance, last year Calderon proposed anti-laundering legislation, after earlier announcing restrictions on cash transactions in Mexico that used U.S. dollars.

The evolving anti-laundering campaign could change the tone of the government's military-led crime crusade by striking at the heart of the cartels' financial empire, analysts say. But the effort will have to overcome a longtime lack of political will and poor coordination among Mexican law enforcement agencies that have only aggravated the complexity of the task at hand now.

"If you don't take away their property, winning this war is impossible," said Sen. Ricardo Garcia Cervantes of the Senate security committee and Calderon's conservative National Action Party. "You are not going to win this war with bullets."

The good news for Mexican and Colombian traffickers is that drug sales in the United States generate enormous income, nearly all of it in readily spendable cash. The bad news is that this creates a towering logistical challenge: getting the proceeds back home to pay bills, buy supplies — from guns to chemicals to trucks — and build up the cartels' empires without detection.

Laundering allows traffickers to disguise the illicit earnings as legitimate through any number of transactions, such as cash transfers, big-ticket purchases, currency exchanges and deposits.

Much of that money still makes its way back into Mexico the old-fashioned way: in duffels stuffed into the trunks of cars. But Mexican drug traffickers are among the world's most savvy entrepreneurs, and launderers have proved nimble in evading authorities' efforts to catch them, adopting a host of new techniques to move the ill-gotten wealth.

For example, Mexican traffickers are taking advantage of blind spots in monitoring the nearly $400 billion of legal commerce between the two countries. The so-called trade-based laundering allows crime groups to disguise millions of dollars in tainted funds as ordinary merchandise — say, onions or precious metals, as they are trucked across the border.

In one case, the merchandise of choice was tons of polypropylene pellets used for making plastic. Exports of the product from the United States to Mexico appeared legitimate, but law enforcement officials say that by declaring a slightly inflated value, traders were able to hide an average of more than $1 million a month, until suspicious banks shut down the operation.

The inventive ploys even include gift cards, such as the kind you get your nephew for graduation. A drug-trafficking foot soldier simply loads up a prepaid card with dollars and walks across the border without having to declare sums over the usual $10,000 reporting requirement, thus carrying a car trunk's worth of cargo in his wallet.

Tainted cash is almost everywhere. In western Mexico, a minor-league soccer club known as the Raccoons was part of a sprawling cross-border empire — including car dealerships, an avocado export firm, hotels and restaurants — that U.S. officials said was used by suspect Wenceslao Alvarez to launder money for the Gulf cartel. Alvarez was arrested by Mexican authorities in 2008 in a rare blow against laundering and remains in prison while fighting the charges.

Even the most unlikely street-corner businesses may be used to scrub money. A pair of tanning salons in the western state of Jalisco were among 225 properties seized from drug suspect Sandra Avila Beltran, the so-called Queen of the Pacific and one of the few women allegedly to reach upper cartel echelons.

Avila, arrested in 2007, is still behind bars on the money-laundering charges as she also fights extradition to the U.S., but she has been exonerated of organized-crime and weapons charges.

The salons, with their all-cash, high-volume turnover, were allegedly used to hide drug money. The chain, called Electric Beach, has outlets all over Mexico City.

Mexico's efforts against money-laundering are hobbled by staff shortages, a failure to investigate adequately and skimpy laws that have exempted from scrutiny a number of industries often used to clean dirty money, independent assessments by financial experts and academics have found.

Javier Laynez Potisek, Mexico's fiscal prosecutor, lamented during a September conference on money-laundering, "Our system allows someone to come in with a suitcase full of money and buy four armored pickups for 600,000 pesos [about $42,000], and we don't have a minimum requirement to identify or report them."

A 2009 report issued by the Financial Action Task Force, an international anti-money-laundering agency, noted that Mexican authorities had won only 25 convictions for money-laundering in the two decades it has been a crime. From the beginning of 2009 to mid-2010, as overall drug-war arrests soared, prosecutors won convictions of only 37 people for money-laundering.

Part of the problem is that only Mexico's Finance Ministry has had access to financial data crucial to potential money-laundering inquiries, and prosecutors have not been allowed to open their own money-laundering investigations without a complaint from finance officials.

There is also stubborn resistance among those who profit from their role as middlemen for big transactions.

One such group is notaries, who in Mexico have a function much like attorneys in the U.S. They handle nearly all real estate transactions and have battled a proposal that would require them to report how each purchase was paid for. Notaries say launderers would probably respond by skipping the paperwork altogether when buying cars and houses, only adding to the black-market economy.

"The only thing that worries us notaries is that [the proposed reporting requirements] would create an alternative market … that brings benefits to no one," said Hector Galeano, finance secretary of Mexico's notaries association.

Some observers suggest that one reason previous Mexican governments were slow to attack money-laundering was fear of harming the rest of the economy.

Edgardo Buscaglia, a scholar who studies organized crime, estimates that in a nation where three-quarters of all transactions are cash, drug money has infiltrated 78% of the sectors constituting the formal economy.

In Sinaloa, the prosperous coastal state considered the cradle of the Mexican narcotics trade, economist Guillermo Ibarra estimates that drug money sustains nearly a fifth of the region's economy, from fancy subdivisions dotted with "narco-mansions" to vast farms.

Sinaloa is a well-known produce grower; in fact, its license plate features a tomato. But it would take an awful lot of tomatoes to account for the kind of over-the-top opulence on display in the state.

The moves to turn the tide in dirty money have generally taken place out of public view. But they could mark an important shift in the drug-war strategy.

A year ago, a small group of Mexican officials and U.S. counterparts met and selected six money-laundering cases to investigate jointly in an experimental offensive. U.S. agents here say the first arrests, involving a network in the northern border state of Chihuahua, could come by year's end.

Separately, U.S. Customs officials familiar with sophisticated money-laundering techniques have begun training Mexican tax inspectors who will be assigned to ferret out launderers. In addition, nearly 500 individuals and Mexican companies, from mines to milk producers, have been placed on a U.S. Treasury Department blacklist for alleged laundering activities.

And the Mexican Congress, after years of government inaction on the issue, is weighing a series of legislative proposals based on Calderon's anti-laundering package that would make it more difficult to cleanse dirty money. In the meantime, the restrictions on the use of U.S. cash in Mexico appear to be altering the flow of drug-tainted dollars for the first time, officials on both sides of the border say.

Under the proposed legislation, a specialized unit added to the attorney general's office, with advice from U.S. officials, would be authorized to take the lead in money-laundering cases and inspect a wide variety of businesses in search of illicit profits.

In addition, the government nearly a year ago replaced the Finance Ministry official in charge of such cases with a veteran Washington-based diplomat, Jose Alberto Balbuena, who had spent many months working with U.S. financial officials and is said to have a better grasp of what's at stake and a good working relationship with top prosecutors.

To date, Mexican reporting requirements have applied only to banks. Under legislation approved by the Senate last year and now before the lower Chamber of Deputies, a range of other industries would also be required to report large cash or suspicious transactions using unexplained funds.

These include real estate, car dealerships, betting parlors, art galleries, notaries, and, possibly, religious institutions. Mirroring "know your customer" regulations in the banking world, the rules would require disclosure of cash purchases for more than 200,000 pesos, or about $14,000, of numerous goods and place a cap of 1 million pesos, or about $70,000, on cash purchases of real estate.

Law enforcement experts say the proposed legislation could fill a yawning gap in Mexico's crime fight.

"It's going to counteract the financial and economic power of the criminals," said Ricardo Gluyas, a professor at the National Institute of Criminal Sciences, which trains Mexico's organized-crime prosecutors. "The new law has teeth. It covers a broad spectrum."

One potentially powerful tool, an asset-forfeiture law that allows authorities to seize property and accounts of traffickers and launderers, was approved by Congress in 2008. A similar law made a big difference in crime fights in Colombia and Italy, allowing authorities in those countries to confiscate and resell properties of drug traffickers and Mafiosi.

"Without firing a shot, you can generate a lot more results by seizing the fortunes of the big capos," Gluyas said.

But critics say the Mexican asset-forfeiture law threatens the due-process rights of owners. So far, it has been little used: Courts had approved only two cases by late this summer, with more than a dozen pending.

Perhaps more than any other measure, the government's move last year to restrict bank deposits of U.S. cash appears to have slowed the entry of dollars to Mexico's financial system. Bank-account holders were no longer allowed to deposit more than $4,000 a month.

In response, traffickers and their launderers are shifting tactics, including keeping money in the United States, officials say. And U.S. officials say that since Mexico announced the new rules, more money appears to be going elsewhere, especially to the Caribbean and Guatemala, where officials have detected a surge in circulating U.S. bank notes.

"That's the big question," Balbuena said. "Where is the money?"

A possible explanation can perhaps be gleaned from an Oct. 5 incident: Customs inspectors in Tijuana stopped an armored car full of plastic bags stuffed with $915,000 in cash. There was no documentation for the money, law enforcement sources familiar with the discovery said.

But it wasn't headed into Mexico. It was headed north, into San Diego.



Michael Hearns an Anti Money Laundering specialist with over 24 years of AML experience can also be found at
www.launderingmoney.com 
and on twitter at :
http://twitter.com/#!/LaunderingMoney 
http://moneylaunderingworld.blogspot.com